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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GARY D. ACKER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Case No. 
12268 
Appellant, Gary D. Acker, appeals the constitutionality 
of Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-107 .8 (a) ( 19 53 ), oper-
ating a motorcycle upon a public highway posted for a speed 
higher than 35 miles per hour without wearing protective 
headgear, and a finding of guilty. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was convicted and sentenced m the 
Ogden City Court and appealed that city court conviction to 
the Second District Court, Weber County, State of Utah. The 
Second District Court, the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, presid-
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ing, upheld the conviction and found Utah Code Annot-
ated, Section 41-6-107.8 (a) (1953) constitutional. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant respectfully requests the court to set aside 
the conviction on the grounds that the statute under which 
he was convicted is unconstitutional. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant was convicted and sentenced m the 
Ogden City Court of Ogden City, County of Weber, Utah, for 
having operated a motorcycle upon a public highway posted 
for a speed higher than 35 miles per hour without wearing a 
protective headgear which complied with standard established 
by the Utah Commissioner of Public Safety, in violation of 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-107.8 (a) (1953), which 
reads: 
No person shall operate or ride upon a motor-
cycle or motor-driven cycle upon a public 
highway posted for speeds higher than 35 miles 
per hour, unless he is wearing protective head-
gear which complies with standards established 
by the commissioner of public safety. 
The appellant appealed that city court conviction and 
sentence and the matter was set for trial de novo in the Second 
District Court, the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde presiding. The 
evidence was stipulated. It was stipulated that the appellant 
had been arrested while operating a motorcycle upon a public 
highway in a zone posted for speeds higher than 35 miles per 
hour, without wearing any protective headgear. 
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The appellant moved the court to dismiss the com-
plaint and discharge the appellant on the grounds that the 
evidence failed to prove the appellant had committed any 
crime and that Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-107.8 (a) 
( 19 53), the statute under which the appellant is charged, is 
unconstitutional, void, and of no effect whatsoever. After 
hearing oral arguments, the court found the appellant guilty 
and the statute constitutional. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO PROVE THE APPELL-
ANT HAD COMMITTED ANY CRIME. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-107.8 (a) (1953), 
under which the appellant is charged, reads: 
No person shall operate or ride upon a motor-
cycle or motor-driven cycle upon a public 
highway posted for speeds higher than 35 miles 
per hour, unless he is wearing protective head-
gear which complies with standards established 
by the commissioner or public safety. 
Admittedly, the evidence did show that the appellant 
operated a motorcycle upon a public highway posted for 
speeds higher than 35 miles per hour without wearing protect-
ive headgear; however, there was no evidence whatsoever as 
proof of the last required element of the alleged offense, i.e., 
noncompliance with standards established by the commiss-
ioner of public safety. 
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To date, the appellant is unaware of and unable to 
find any standards in this area that have been established by 
the commissioner of public safety. Relying on the fact that 
no such standards exist, the state is unable to prove every 
element of the alleged offense. Without being able to show a 
violation of such standards, the complaint should be dismissed 
and the appellant discharged. 
POINT II 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 41-6-107.8 
(a) (1953), UNDER WHICH THE APPELLANT IS CHARGED, 
VIOLATES THE FIFTH, NINTH, AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED ST ATES CONSTITUTION 
IN THAT IT IS AN INVALID EXERCISE OF THE POLICE 
POWER OF THE ST ATE TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC WEL-
FARE; IT IS AN UNREASONABLE INFRINGEMENT OF 
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND THE RIGHT TO THE FREE 
USE OF ONE'S PROPERTY; AND ITS STANDARDS ARE 
TOO VAGUE AND INDEFINITE TO BE ENFORCEABLE. 
Motorcycle helmet regulations are of comparatively 
recent origin and typically provide that operators and pass-
engers of motorcycles and motor scooters must wear pro-
tective helmets of a type approved by a state agency. 
Such regulations reflect a widespread effort to combat 
the rising death and injury toll of accidents in which motor-
cyclists are involved. 
The courts have reached different results as to the 
constitutional validity of the helmet law in those jurisdictions 
in which the issue has been raised. In some cases, courts have 
upheld motorcycle helmet regulations as a legitimate exercise 
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of the police power of the state to legislate for the promotion 
of the general health, safety, and welfare, pointing out, in 
effect, that without helmets, motorcyclists are particularly 
vulnerable to being struck in the head by loose stones kicked 
up by wheels, which may cause such injury or distraction to 
the operator as could result in loss of his control of the motor-
cycle, thereby endangering other users of the public highways. 
On the other hand, there is authority to the effect 
that the helmet regulations are unconstitutional because they 
do not bear a substantial relationship to the protection of the 
general public but serve only to protect the individual motor-
cycle operator from himself. 
So far as can be determined, this case is of first im-
pression in Utah. Michigan, ~merica_B_Motorcyc_k__Ass'n v. 
Q~\j_ds, 158 N.W. 2d 72 (1968); Illinois, Illinois v. fries, 250 
N.E. 2d 149 (1969), and Ohio, State v. Betts, 252, N.E. 2d 
266 ( 1969 ), have held helmet statutes to be unconstitutional. 
The New Yark circuit court of appeals has split decisions on 
this type of law. People v. Small~_ood, 271 N.Y.S. 2d 429, 
(1967) has held the helmet statute to be unconstitutional 
while Peyele v. ~iel~er., 282 N.Y.S. 2d 797 (1969), has 
held it to be constitutional. As far as can be determined, the 
New York Supreme Court has not made a decision. 
It is conceded that a majority of the cases have held 
helmet statutes to be constitutional. See _g~~hardt v. Ne~ 
Orleans, 217 So. 2d 400 (1968); State v. Laite_Bl!!., 459 P. 2d 
789 (1969); ~tate_v. _E,itel 227 So. 2d 489 (1969); ~~te v. 
Albertson, 470 P. 2d 300, (1970); Lav~ v. ~ill., 465 P. 2d 118 
(1970), and others. 
-5-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In all of the recent challenges, the questions were 
whether such laws were too vague and indefinite to be en-
forceable, or were an unreasonable infringement of individual 
liberty. 
If either of the above challenges to this type of statute 
is valid, then fundamental rights are being denied by the states 
without due process of law as provided for in the Fifth, Ninth 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitut-
ion. 
The Fifth Amendment provides: 
No person shall ... be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law ... 
The Ninth Amendment provides: 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of 
certain rights, shall not be construed to 
deny or disparge others retained by the 
people. 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides: 
No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of dtize-ns of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person with-
in its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws. 
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The power of the state is the power vested in the leg-
islature to enact laws not repugnant to the Constitution which 
shall protect the public health, safety and welfare. State ex 
~l Co~ v. Board of Education of S.L.C., 21 Utah 401. The 
police power of the state extends only to the protection of 
public health, public safety, and public welfare and insures 
each individual an uninterrupted enjoyment of the rights and 
privileges conferred on him by law. Nebbi~ v. New York, 291 
U.S. 502 (1934). Insofar as the police power is utilized by 
the state, the means employed to effect its exercise may be 
neither arbitrary nor oppressive, but must bear a real and sub-
stantial relation to an end which is public. The ancient maxim 
"sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas" (so use your own that 
you do not injure that of another) has often been cited as one 
of the essential bases of the police power. In this regard, the 
protection of the public welfare through past application of 
the police power has been limited to instances where one in-
dividual's conduct adversely affected others, not merely his 
own. To uphold Utah's helmet statute would represent an 
extension of the limits of the police power to include the re-
gulation of an individual's conduct where he alone could be 
adversely affected. 
Let us now compare the arguments supporting and 
opposing helmet statutes. 
A. Public Welfare threatened. 
The arguments favoring helmet statues are based 
on the contention that the public welfare is endangered by 
the unhelmeted rider. Courts upholding helmet statutes have 
relied on one or a combination of propositions based on this 
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theory. In State v. Lombardi, 241 A 2d 625 (1968), the court 
suggests that the injured rider will become a burden on 
society and holds that the legislature is not powerless to pro-
hibit individuals from pursuing a course of conduct which 
could conceivably result in their becoming public charges. In 
addition to being a potential case for public economic assist-
ance, the disabled rider will be unable to add his fair share to 
the productivity of society. On this point, the court in £.~le 
v. Carmichael, 288 N.Y.S. 2d 931, (1968) stated: "It is to the 
interest of the state to have strong, robust, healthy citizens 
capable of self-support, of bearing arms, and of adding to the 
resources of the country." 
Of course, the fallacy of propositions such as these is 
glaringly magnified when the same logic is applied to other 
frailties of human beings. Should the state through the exer-
cise of its police power be able to criminally punish individuals 
who expose themselves to diseases or to other injurious accid-
ents? Of course not! Surely America is not on the road of 
agreement with Hitler and his concepts of the perfect race 
whereby the weak and afflicted are annihilated. 
B. Direct Benefit to Others. 
In contrast to those benefits accruing to the 
individual cyclist and thus to the whole of society, some courts 
have found in helmet statutes a legislative intent to confer 
direct benefits to certain classes of citizens, specifically, high-
way users. Since the rider is in an exposed position, it has 
been suggested by some courts that flying stones or bugs 
might strike the unhelmeted rider's head, causing loss of con-
trol, thereby endangering pedestrians or other motorists. 
State v. Lombardi, supra. 
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If this reasoning were sound, a uniform application 
and equal protection of laws would also require helmets to be 
worn by riders in convertibles or other vehicles that were 
not fully enclosed and protected from such objects. 
C. Power to Control Use of Highways 
The position that the use of the public highways 
is a privilege, not a right, is assumed by some courts to justify 
helmet laws as a valid exercise of state police power. Common-
wealth v.l:_f_S?wi~ 238 N.E. 2d 373 (1968). Even though the 
use of the public highways may be only a conditional privilege 
subject to state control, the state may not exercise this power 
arbitarily. Wall v. Kin~, 206 F. 2d 878 (1953). The legislature 
must still determine that the public welfare is endangered and 
must reasonably exercise the police powers to meet that public 
need. 
D. Equipment Regulation. 
The final contention favoring helmet statutes 
sees them as simply equipment regulations, similar to those 
requiring seat belts and other safety devices; therefore, no 
problem of individual liberty is involved. While, however, 
nearly every state requires that new automobiles be equipped 
with seat belts, no state has gone so far as to demand on penal 
sanctions that they must be worn. 
Requiring manufacturers to equip vehicles with safety 
devices is substantially different from requiring an individual 
to do something protective about his personal welfare alone. 
This distinctiction is crucial and is the basis of the counter 
arguments that the helmet statutes are unconstitutional. 
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Arguments Opposing Statutes 
A. Infringement of Individual Liberty. 
The central argument challenges the constitution-
ality of helmet statutes on the ground that only the individual 
and not the public welfare is endangered. Hence, the state 
should not invoke its police powers. American Motorcycl~ 
Ass'n. v . .Qavids, Supra. 
Freedom of choice, if that choice does not 
affect the public welfare, includes the right 
to make what the majority believes to be the 
wrong or unintelligent choice, as well as the 
right or intelligent choice. For if the majority 
can set itself up to judge, in matters of individ-
ual welfare, between right and wrong, and 
enforce those judgments with criminal sanct-
ions, then all areas of personal liberty will be 
jeopardized. 
The police power does not undertake to pro-
tect the individual against his own acts, partly 
because that would involve an inquisitorial 
control over private life and conduct both 
intolerable and unenforceable, partly because 
police power ought not and is not intended to 
be a substitute for individual self-control and 
responsibility but finds its proper sphere in 
guarding against evils and dangers beyond the 
control of him whom they threaten. The right 
to choose one course of action even to the ex-
tent of incurring risks where others are not 
concerned is a part of individual liberty. E. 
Freund, The Police Power, Public Policy and 
Constitutional Rights. Section 15 5 ( 1904). 
Similarly, to allow this type of regulation is to open 
the door to an unlimited benevolent parternalism of govern-
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ment which would surely be inimical to our democratic way 
of life and our constitutionally protected liberties. 
The court in American Motorcycle Ass'!!_ v. Davids, 
Supra. held the helmet statute to be unconstitutional as an 
invalid exercise of the state's police power, since it has no re-
lationship to public safety. The court stated: 
It is contended by the plaintiff that the legis-
lative concern is solely related to the safety 
of the motorcyclist and passenger and can have 
no possible relationship to the safety and well-
being of other persons, much less the public 
at large. 
There can be no doubt that the state has a substantial 
interest in highway safety. In Smith v. Wayne Co. Sheriff, 
278 Mich. 91, 96 (1936), the court said, "It is well settled 
that the legislature has the power to control and regulate the 
use of the highways." but the difficulty with adopting this as 
a basis for decision is that it would also justify a requirement 
that automobile drivers wear helmets or buckle their seat 
belts for their own protection. 
These arguments all prove too much. 
In a series of decisions, this court has held that 
even though the governmental purpose be ligitimate and sub-
stantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broad-
ly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be 
more narrowly achieved. 
The plaintiff relies also upon the reserved powers 
under the Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
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and cites the recent decision in Greswold v. Connecticut ---- ______ , 
381 U.S. 479, (1965 ), wherein Justice Goldberg, concurring, 
invoked this amendment to invalidate a Connecticut statute 
making the use of contraceptives by the individual user a pri-
vate right of the individual free from state coercion and con-
trol, and equated this right with the right to be let alone. 
Justice Brandeis stated this principle in Olmstea_Q. v. Colorad_g, 
277 U.S. 438, (1928). 
B. Legislative Intent Solely to Protect Rider. 
Courts which have struck down helmet statutes 
find a clear and single legislative purpose is to afford the rider 
an added degree of protection in case of mishaps. This view 
tends to deny that such statutes act to directly benefit other 
users of the highways. 
Suggesting that the problem of loss of control due to 
flying stones or bugs was not intended to be met by helmet 
statutes, the court in State v. Betts, Supra, stated: 
It is said that the wearing of a mask and 
helmet might well prevent a stone or bug from 
hitting a cyclist in the face, causing him to lose 
control of his cycle, swerve into the oncoming 
traffic lane and cause a grievous accident. This 
court is of the opinion that to uphold the 
statute under such reasoning would torture 
logic beyond its limits. 
C. Detrimental Effects of Helmets. 
Courts have raised another point to invalidate a 
mandatory helmet statute. Rather than being beneficial, it is 
contended that the wearing of a crash helmet tends to impair 
the rider's vision and hearing. This impairment makes the 
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rider less aware of what is occurring around him and, there-
fore, more of a menace to others on the highways. 
D. Statutes Too Vague and Indefinite to be Enforc-
ed. 
The final argument posed in opposition to hel-
met statutes is that statutory standards are too vague and 
indefinite to inform the cyclist of what is required of him. 
If the standards are not sufficiently clear and avail-
able to the cyclist, conviction for violating such a statute 
would constitute deprivation of liberty without due process 
of law. 
U. S. Constitution Amendment VI, provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right ... to be informed of the nature 
and cause of accusation ... 
"The effect of the clause entitling an accused 
to know the nature and cause of accusation 
against him commences with the statutes fix-
ing or declaring offenses. It adopts the general 
rule of common law that such statutes are not 
to be construed to embrace offenses which are 
not within their intentions and terms." See 
UniteU~t~ v. LCohen_Qr_ocery_~Q., 264 
F. 218, aff'd. 255 U.S. 81 (1921 ). 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-107.8 (a) (1953), 
under which the defendant is charged in the instant case, 
merely refers to standards established by the commissioner 
of public safety. No such standards were in evidence, and no 
such standards have been made available to the defendant. 
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POINT III 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 41-6-107.8 
(a) (1953), UNDER WHICH THE DEFENDANT IS CHARG-
ED, VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED 
ST ATES CONSTITUTION IN THAT IT IS ARBITRARY 
AND CAPRICIOUS'. 
The rule is well settled that a state may classify persons 
and objects for the purpose of legislation. District of Colum-
bia v. BrQ9ke, 218 U.S. 138. This is not sufficient to relieve a 
statute from the reach of the equality clause of the Fourteen-
th Amendment however. One of the essential requirements as 
to classification, is that it must not be capricious or arbitrary, 
but must have a rational basis. 
Utah's helmet statute is only concerned with those 
motorcyclists who are upon public highways posted for speeds 
in excess of 35 miles per hour. No other state has this added 
provision. Such classification is arbitrary and has no rational 
basis when considered in light of the other arguments. It has 
no relationship to the act of the person, but the particular 
highway he may be on. 
The effect of this prov1s1on then makes the law 
applicable only to certain members of the class of people who 
ride motorcycles. When law involves classification, it must 
effect alike, all persons in the same class. Duncan v. Missouit 
153 U.S. 377. In the case of Utah's helmet statute, if a person 
who rides a motorcycle, lives in an area surrounded only by 
highways, he is absolutely precluded from riding his motor-
cycle without a helmet. The person who lives in a residential 
area however, has much greater freedom to ride his motor-
cycle. 
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Because of the arbitrary nature of the law, the entire 
law must be declared void. 
CONCLUSION 
The court should grant the defendant's motion to 
dismiss the complaint and discharge the defendant for the 
reasons stated in this brief on the grounds that the plaintiff 
has failed to prove the defendant has committed any crime 
and that Utah's helmet statute is unconstitutional. 
The single legislative intent to protect the individual, 
not the public, is made clear by inclusion of the requirement 
that the passenger as well as the operator of a motorcycle 
wear protective headgear. In jury to the passenger could cer-
tainly cause no harm to other motorists on the highways. 
Also, this is strengthened by the requirement only being 
applicable in areas where the posted speed limit is in excess 
of 35 miles per hour. 
Utah's helmet statute, inter alia, is an atempt to 
unconstitutionally exercise the state's police power and 
should be declared invalid, unconstitutional, and of no effect 
whatsoever. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN SCIVER, FLORENCE, 
HUTCHISON & SHARP 
Brian R. Florence 
Attorney for Appellant 
818 - 26th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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